2012 Summer Project Week:Threat Modeling - Revision history

JChris.FillionR: /* Key Investigators */

2012-06-22T14:41:26Z

Key Investigators

2012-06-22T14:32:06Z

Key Investigators

2012-06-22T14:13:27Z

Key Investigators

2012-06-22T11:57:10Z

Key Investigators

2012-06-22T05:26:31Z

Key Investigators

2012-06-22T03:22:19Z

Key Investigators

2012-06-22T03:20:11Z

Key Investigators

2012-06-19T14:11:35Z

Key Investigators

2012-06-19T13:13:37Z

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2012-06-17T22:03:17Z

Key Investigators

@@ Line 59: / Line 59: @@
 **What is the situation with OpenIGTLink?
 *Secure build: compiler/linker options
-**These are basically "freebees". See [http://www.na-mic.org/Bug/view.php?id=2250 #2250]
+**These are basically "freebees". See [http://www.na-mic.org/Bug/view.php?id=2250 #2250], topic pushed on jcfr fork [https://github.com/jcfr/Slicer/tree/2250-windows-security-flag 2250-windows-security-flag]
 *Best practices

@@ Line 59: / Line 59: @@
 **What is the situation with OpenIGTLink?
 *Secure build: compiler/linker options
-**These are basically "freebees".
+**These are basically "freebees". See [http://www.na-mic.org/Bug/view.php?id=2250 #2250]
 *Best practices

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:13, 22 June 2012
Line 60:		Line 60:
	*Secure build: compiler/linker options		*Secure build: compiler/linker options
	**These are basically "freebees".		**These are basically "freebees".
		+	*Best practices

@@ Line 57: / Line 57: @@
 *Network interfaces
 **Investigate limiting functionality and sandboxing
 *Secure build: compiler/linker options
 **These are basically "freebees".

@@ Line 52: / Line 52: @@
 **Default to executable CLIs running in low privileged child processes. Use in proc libs only when necessary.
 **Reduce execution of CLIs to those actually used by supporting an xml file rather than --xml
-**Investigate sandboxes for python
+**Investigate sandboxes for python. (i.e [https://github.com/haypo/pysandbox/ pysandbox])
 *Complex file formats
 **Investigate loading and validating files in low privileged child process

@@ Line 9: / Line 9: @@
 * Kitware: Jean-Christophe Fillion-Robin (JC), Julien Finet (J2)
 * Radnostics: Anthony Blumfield
 <div style="margin: 20px;">

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:20, 22 June 2012
Line 37:		Line 37:

	<h3>Progress</h3>		<h3>Progress</h3>
		+	Four major areas identified:
		+	*Code from many sources
		+	*Complex file formats (e.g. DICOM)
		+	*Network interfaces
		+	*Build
		+
		+	Strategy:
		+	*Start with low hanging fruit
		+	*Invest in measures that enhance security & quality simultaneously
		+
		+	Mitigations:
		+	*CLIs:
		+	**Default to executable CLIs running in low privileged child processes. Use in proc libs only when necessary.
		+	**Reduce execution of CLIs to those actually used by supporting an xml file rather than --xml
		+	**Investigate sandboxes for python
		+	*Complex file formats
		+	**Investigate loading and validating files in low privileged child process
		+	*Network interfaces
		+	**Investigate limiting functionality and sandboxing
		+	*Secure build: compiler/linker options
		+	**These are basically "freebees".

@@ Line 30: / Line 30: @@
 Focus on elevation of privilege threats; punt other threat types to a later stage
-Meeting Tuesday noon-3PM, Room 32-D407
+Meeting Tuesday noon-3PM, Room 32-D407 (walk through D408)
 </div>

@@ Line 28: / Line 28: @@
 During project week we will create a high level threat model for 3D Slicer v4 and identify possible mitigations
-Focus on elevation of privilege threats; punt other threat types to a later stage.
+Focus on elevation of privilege threats; punt other threat types to a later stage
 </div>